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Abstract: The investment procedure prescribes the stages and tests through which all investment projects must 
pass before being accepted or not. It governs the conditions of acceptability and constitutes a powerful device of 
a priori control. In this paper, we intend to understand how investment procedures enable grand ideals regarding 
investment to be institutionalised. In particular, over and above the assumed effectiveness and rationale of these 
procedures, we identify the mechanisms through which these procedures construct social roles. In this respect, 
this research goes beyond the procedures’ technical functions and focuses on the very form of procedures. 
Indeed, the form of a procedure presents two features: it is written, generally consigned to a “manual”; and it 
relies on “cognitive artefacts” (Norman, 1991) or “technologies of the intellect” (Goody, 1977) such as lists, 
tables and formulae like Discounted Cash Flow. This paper shows how this specific form takes effect during the 
process of institutionalisation, through which grand investment ideals (e.g. competitiveness, value creation) are 
transformed into concrete devices and into roles (Miller, 1991). Thanks to an enquiry conducted in 2003 and 
2004, investment procedures in six large companies in a French context are analysed. It is argued that (1) the 
formalisation of the objectives of the procedures, as well as the definitions of investment through typologies 
shape the actors’ boundaries of action; (2) valuation methods based on the domination of economic-
mathematical formula favour short-term over long-term reflection; (3) the setting of decision-making thresholds 
formalise individuals’ tasks and responsibilities. Therefore, the very form of procedures shape each phase of the 
institutionalisation process <objectivation – stabilisation – subjectivation> as defined by Hasselbladh and 
Kallinikos (2000) and contribute to creates a singular world – that of investment decisions.  
Keywords: procedure, investment, written text, artefacts, technologies of the intellect, institutionalisation 
 
 
                                                      
1 Corresponding author 
  1“However, there exists a kind of Ariadne’s thread enabling us to move continuously 
from the local to the global, from the human to the non-human. It is a web of 
practices and instruments, documents and translations. An organisation, a market, 
or an institution, are not objects from outer space made from a matter any different 
to our poor, local, terrestrial relations.”  
(Latour, 1997, p.165). 
1. Introduction 
At first glance, what could be more banal, more boring and more dust-covered than an 
investment procedure manual? And yet the most discrete practices often play a role that, 
although often unrecognised, is no less fundamental to social life (Power, 1997). Shifting our 
interest to investment procedures first of all means studying a device well embedded in the 
life of organisations. Indeed, investment procedures benefit from such durability and such a 
wide dissemination in the corporate world (Pezet, 1998; Segelod, 1996) that some observers 
do not hesitate to speak of a “modern paradigm of investment choice” (Hayes et al., 1988). 
Empirical research into the subject indeed shows the firm grip of the procedure and its 
prescribed actions on corporate investment decision-making (Graham & Campbell, 2001; 
Pike, 1996). 
From the point of view of management theories, the investment procedure is one of the pillars 
of the corporate control system. It ensures a priori the coherence between purposeful 
corporate strategy and investment choices. On a wider scale, it guarantees the effectiveness of 
corporate governance by enabling the control of strategic decision-making (Bouquin and 
DeBodt, 2001). The main in-depth empirical works on investment procedures are American 
(Itsvan, 1961)
2, Swedish (Renck, 1966; Tell, 1978)
3 and French (Engel et al., 1984). A 
common feature of these works is that they all aim to study investment procedure “manuals” 
used in companies. These manuals are valuable documents for those who want to study the 
way in which companies design their investment decisions. They constitute the formalised 
representation thereof. The fact that they exist, however, does not necessarily mean that each 
project unfolds in a way that matches the demands of procedure. Drift and diversion often go 
hand in hand with a framework that is purposefully restricting and which, due to this fact, 
does not always correspond to the needs of the actors (Pezet, 1998). It is in this way that 
investment procedure represents a practical norm. As a norm, it institutes the constraint of 
standardising behaviours; as something practical, it is interpreted, remodelled, and even 
misused by actors. As a practical norm, the procedure also has the particularity of being 
formal. It is a “written administrative routine” (Segelod, 1998). This status lends it 
benchmark value as a standardising tool but also as an element of the control system, as a 
language community or as a “learning driver”. It also ties in with Bower’s conclusions (1970) 
according to which senior management does not choose investments directly from requests 
issued by decentralised units, but by constructing the “structural context” that ensures the 
consistency of requests with strategic goals. In other terms, directors shape the formal 
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  2organisation, the information and control system, and the incentive system, which will enable 
them to remotely control projects that generally stem from operational levels.  
The question that drives this research into investment procedures, based on an empirical study 
conducted in France in 2004, is of a different kind. Our research objective is neither to 
investigate the actual decision made with the help of procedures nor the “real” use made of 
these procedures. This research focuses on the very form of the procedures and postulates that 
this form fosters the production of social roles. Indeed, the form of a procedure presents two 
features: it is written, generally consigned to a “manual”; and it relies on “cognitive artefacts” 
(Norman, 1991, 1993) or “technologies of the intellect” (Goody, 1977) such as lists, tables 
and formulae like Discounted Cash Flow. Drawing on this, our research endeavours to answer 
the following question: how does the specific form of procedures take effect during the 
process of institutionalisation, through which grand investment ideals (such as 
competitiveness, value creation) are transformed into concrete devices and into roles? 
The process of institutionalisation represents a set of mechanisms through which devices take 
part in producing instituted and generalised conventions. It is this process of <objectivation – 
stabilisation – subjectivation> as defined by Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000) that creates a 
singular world, that of investment decisions, peopled with actors, techniques and discourses. 
By demarcating a domain of action (objectivation) and by then establishing performance 
principles (stabilisation), the form of investment procedures, including written texts and 
diverse artefacts such as lists, tables and formulae, results in the creation, through social roles 
(subjectivation), of a world of investment decisions. This world is consistent with the ideals 
and discourses produced on investment in society and it is the procedure that ensures this 
consistency. 
 
2.  Management Devices and Social Roles: Theoretical 
Considerations 
This research aims at investigating the influence of a particular management device, namely 
the investment procedure manual, on the institutionalisation process of investment ideals. In 
this respect, it draws from the research stream studying accounting in its social dimension 
(Hopwood, 1976; Burchell et al., 1980; Hopwood, Miller, 1994). We propose to study the 
institutionalisation process of accounting ideals by importing concepts from cognitive and 
ethnographic sociology dealing with the properties and effects of written texts (Goody, 1977; 
1986; 2000; Norman, 1991; 1993). This use of sociological concepts will enable us to account 
for a part of he institutionalisation process that is difficult to capture and thus still 
understudied: the subjectivation part of the process, in other words, the influence of 
accounting devices on the society. 
2.1. Studying the social dimension of accounting 
This research lies within the scope of socio-institutional studies of accounting, according to 
the approach defined by Hopwood since the founding of the review Accounting, 
Organizations and Society in 1976 (Hopwood, 1976; Burchell et al., 1980; Hopwood, 1983; 
1987; Miller, O’Leary, 1987; Miller, 1990; Hopwood, Miller, 1994; Baxter, Chua, 2003;   
Hopwood, 2005). It considers accounting (understood in the widest of senses and which, in a 
French context, may be assimilated to management tools) as a social practice subject to the 
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(1985) thus set out to study change in accounting practices (in specific, the introduction of 
assessment of added value in Great Britain in the 1970’s) by investigating the social context 
and by deploying a double relationship, spanning from society to management devices, but 
also from management devices to society: 
“Although it is now recognised that the social can influence the technical practice of 
accounting and that that, in turn, can mobilise and change the world of the social, the 
processes by which these intersections take place have been subject to hardly any 
investigation”(Burchell et al., 1985, p.381). 
For the above statement is recurrent: although management devices are considered a social 
practice, their links with the social remain relatively unchartered from an empirical point of 
view. In this respect, investment practices were the subject of one of Miller’s founding 
articles (1991). Basing his work on concepts borrowed from works by Foucault and Latour 
(problematization, programmes, translation and remote action), Miller analyses the spread of 
discounting methods in Great Britain is the 1960’s. He concludes that a link exists between 
national policies that promote economic growth and the setting up of techniques that meet this 
goal as regards investment choices. The research conducted by Miller emphasises the 
influence of programmes, defined as idealised patterns designed to represent, analyse and 
solve problems associated with particular aspects of social and economic life, on the 
modalities of corporate investment decision-making. The link between society and 
management devices thus appears to span from society to management devices in one 
dimension. As a general rule, it is the articulation amongst problem perception 
(problematization), programmes and technologies that is analysed here (Miller & Rose, 1990; 
Miller & O’Leary, 1994). There remains the second dimension in the relationship to be 
analysed that spans from management devices to society (the creating of social roles) through 
the process of institutionalisation.  
2.2. A traditional research object to account for social dimensions of accounting: the 
institutionalisation process 
For scholars interested in the social dimension of accounting, the institutionalisation process, 
meaning the set of mechanisms through which devices take part in producing instituted and 
generalised conventions, turns out to be a relevant research object. 
Studying the process of institutionalisation lead to gain insight in the interactions between 
accounting and society by deepening the relationship between microscopic and macroscopic 
perspectives. If management devices are social practices, then they participate in a process of 
institutionalisation, as Miller (1994) points out: 
“Accounting can now be seen as a set of practices that affects the type of world we live in, the 
type of social reality we inhabit, the way in which we understand the choices open to business 
undertakings and individuals, the way in which we manage and organize activities and 
processes of diverse types, and the way in which we administer the lives of others and 
ourselves. To view accounting in this way is to attend to the complex interplay between ways 
of calculating and ways of managing social and organizational life” (Miller, 1994, p.1). 
Indeed, neo-institutional research has contributed to the development of the research stream 
considering accounting as a socio-institutional practice since it analyses causal processes that 
link accounting to its institutional environment (Miller, 1994, p.12). Nevertheless, if the 
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investigation. As Hopwood states in an editorial that assesses 30 years of research in 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, “insights are starting to emerge of the ways in which 
accounting relates to wider configurations of institutional processes and designs. […] The 
ways in which economic forms of calculation and control interact with new modes of 
organizing is an area in which much remains to be known” (Hopwood, 2005, p.585-586). 
Following in the “European tradition […] that tends to analyse the patterns of formal 
organizing”, Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000, p.703) denounce the insufficiency of the 
empirical programme of neo-institutional research (“the bird’s eye view” p.700). According to 
these two authors, the neo-institutional empirical programme has remained too macroscopic 
whereas the process of institutionalisation of grand ideals (efficiency, for example) cannot 
afford to do without a technical anchoring in practices. Here, they hint at a traditional critics 
raised at NIS according to which emphasis is put on inter-organizational diffusion processes 
to the detriment of the understanding of how these processes translate into intra-
organizational contexts. As stated by Tolbert and Zucker (1996), we lack details on how the 
process of institutionalisation occurs inside organisations. 
Furthermore, adopting a technique can remain a ceremonial act (Meyer, Rowan, 1977; 
Covaleski et al., 1996). As NIS states, for an institutionalisation process to be completed, 
there is a need for internalisation (Kostova, Roth, 2002). Changing ideals have to be 
objectified, but objectivation does not exhaust institutionalisation (Hasselbladh, Kallinikos, 
2000, p.712). A more invisible side of institutionalisation consists in subjectivation, or the 
internalisation of evolving ideals by organisational actors, meaning the way actors understand 
their roles and enact them into their daily practices according to, against, or regardless of, 
these ideals (Dambrin, Lambert, Sponem, 2006).  
To go beyond these criticisms, Hasselbladh and Kallinikos propose an analysis tool (“an 
analytical device for disentangling the composite totality that makes up the processes of 
institutionalisation”, p.704). Their ambition is to account for the mechanisms by which ideals 
are concretised into practices. Three phenomena constitute the whole process according to 
them (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos, 2000, p.700-701): 
o  Objectivation, by constituting a clearly defined and delimited domain of action 
(for example quality or corporate social responsibility) around which one can 
develop systematic ideas and measurable propositions; 
o  Stabilization, by establishing performance principles, specific rules of conduct 
and control techniques that are stable but also durable and communicable;  
o  Subjectivation, meaning the construction of recognizable and recurrent social 
and organizational roles through management devices.  
2.3. Accounting for the subjectivation part of the institutionalisation process  
Drawing from the analytical device proposed by Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000), this 
research ambitions to better capture the influence of accounting on society. More precisely, 
we aim to study how accounting techniques shape society and, therefore, participate into the 
subjectivation part of the institutionalisation process. 
In this paper, accounting is tackled through management devices. More specifically, 
procedures are chosen to characterize one of these devices, and investment procedure is the 
  5type of procedures which is empirically analysed. Thus, accounting is considered in its 
normative dimension. We do not claim to study accounting in its real practices: the actual 
decision made with the help of procedures and the post evaluation of those decisions are not 
the subject of this research, which focuses on how procedures might influence the actors 
independently of the actual decision-making and how procedures contribute to the emergence 
of social figures that constitute an ideal world of investment making. Therefore, in this 
research, capturing the influence of accounting on society means capturing its influence on 
ideals that shape investment decisions in organizations as well as on the creation of social 
roles around investment decisions. 
To highlight these mechanisms of influence, we intend to analyse how a singular world – that 
of investments – is created, describing the three “stages” that are objectivation, stabilisation 
and subjectivation. In this particular world, the domain of action will be objectified by a 
definition of what an investment is and by a detailed description of the stages of decision-
making. Stabilisation relies on performance principles (profitability of investments, their 
strategic coherence), on rules of conduct (procedures) and on techniques (Discounted Cash 
Flow (DCF), Internal Rate of Return (IRR), or pay back, to mention only the most well-
known). These techniques present the characteristics of stability, durability and 
communicability that are necessary for institutionalisation (Townley, 1995, Hasselbladh, 
Kallinikos, 2000). The DCF, for example, has been widely used in companies since the 
1960’s and its wider dissemination has been ensured internationally through teaching. Finally, 
the subjectivation phase, meaning the creation of social roles, covers the defining of roles for 
each person concerned using a certain number of artefacts. This last phase is definitely the 
one of which this research aims to enrich the understanding. However, it is postulated that for 
subjectivation to be understood, objectivation and stabilisation must be studied as well. On the 
one hand, one phase of a process cannot be analysed independently of the others. On the other 
hand, we will show that objectivation as well as stabilisation set the conditions for 
subjectivation, they configurate the role that are about to develop in the subjectivation phase. 
Therefore, if our main objective is to account for the subjectivation phase in the 
institutionalisation process, the whole process (objectivation, stabilisation, subjectivation) 
needs to be analysed to satisfy this objective. It is this process that we will be studying using 
an empirical study dealing with investment procedures. 
2.4. Applying sociological concepts to the study of accounting influence on social roles 
and ideals 
To highlight accounting devices’ role in the institutionalisation process, we build on 
sociological concepts stemming from cognitive science (Norman, 1991; 1993) and from 
social ethnography (Goody, 1977; 1986; 2000) dealing with the characteristics of written 
texts. As stated in the introduction, a basic motive for this research has been to consider that 
the form of accounting devices in itself has a great influence on individual’s roles in 
organizations. The empirical object that has been studied for this research, namely, investment 
procedures, is a specific set of texts and artefacts. We consider that studying an accounting 
device such as investment procedures according to its written properties (textuality and 
cognitive artefacts) will enable us to reveal some social dimensions of the institutionalisation 
process and to better capture how techniques shape society. More precisely, we intend to 
show that the written properties of procedures contribute to strengthen social ideals that found 
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populate the ideal investment world. 
 
To characterize the written properties of a procedure, we will use the terminology of Goody 
(1977), “technologies of the intellect”, and of Norman (1993), “ cognitive artefacts“, without 
distinction: that is to say, “artificial tools designed to preserve, reveal and handle information 
with the aim of satisfying a representational function”, “an artefact is what amplifies human 
aptitudes” (Norman, 1993, p.18-21). Written texts of procedures are studded with these 
technologies or artefacts. Furthermore, writing itself produces “effects (…) on the 
organisation of human societies” (Goody, 1986, p.171), in particular through the storage of 
data that it enables. 
According to Goody (1977, 1986), the written form actually produces three significant 
consequences. First, the writing of a text authorises interpretation and manipulation. 
However, the text is also a reference, because: “literacy encouraged, at the very same time, 
criticism and commentary on the one hand and the orthodoxy of the book on the other.” 
(Goody, 1977, p. 37). So the text offers an opportunity to be translated, even to be betrayed, 
but is also presented as an indispensable benchmark. The second consequence is that writing, 
and in particular the modes of communication adopted (texts but also tables, lists and 
formulae), produces effects on the cognitive capacities of individuals. Goody analyses the 
“role of changes in the mode of communication in the development of cognitive structures 
and processes, and in developments in the growth of human knowledge and in the growth of 
man’s capacities to store and augment that knowledge.” (Goody, 1977, p.36). In this regard, 
the example of lists is revealing: on the one hand, they enable information to be stored and so 
facilitate spatial and temporal communication, recording and recall; on the other hand, they 
enable a shift from the aural to the visual domain and so “enables it to be inspected, 
manipulated and re-ordered in a variety of ways” (Goody, 1977, p.76). Lists thus not only 
promote new technical skills but also new intellectual aptitudes. Lists are “cognitive 
artefacts” (Norman, 1993) and, in their form as an artefact, shape the individual’s cognition. 
Check-lists “improve the memory and facilitate performance, but from the point of view of the 
person, they modify the task” (Norman, 1993, p.23). Indeed, we now have to draw up a list, 
understand that it is the list that we must consult rather than doing the tasks directly and, 
finally, read and interpret the list’s content. Finally, the third consequence of the textual form 
is that “the growth of bureaucracy clearly depends to a considerable degree upon the ability 
to control ‘secondary group’ relationships by means of written communications” (Goody, 
1977, p.15), as Max Weber has already shown. In other words, beyond the individual 
aptitudes that they produce, written forms of communication, the “technologies of the 
intellect” (Goody, 1977, p.244), support power organizing and the corresponding modalities 
of control. 
As for any kind of procedure, the investment procedure’s form is based on the recourse to the 
written word and on a series of intellectual technologies or cognitive artefacts. The 
investment procedure is a key device in investment decision-making. It therefore plays a 
role in the process of institutionalising ideals, discourses and programmes, by creating a 
singular world around investment decision-making. The investment procedure manual is the 
master document, the investment’s score that conducts the orchestration in its slightest details 
so that it may take place without excessive improvisation. Indeed, procedures outline the steps 
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acceptability, and they constitute a powerful device for formalising the financial paradigm. 
Addressed to all corporate actors, and in particular those who instigate investments, this 
veritable “management machine” (Girin, 1981) aims to standardise behaviours and establish 
a norm of conduct. Procedures integrate the whole of the decision-making process, including 
valuation and post-valuation, and thus represent the “practical norm” used in companies. They 
therefore constitute a remarkable yet discrete instrumentation; who could be concerned about 
a document that, at first glance, comes straight out of what modern management would see as 
well worn and slightly obsolete bureaucracy? However, the procedure governs the whole 
device of investment decision-making through a text that is based on a series of prescribed 
actions, the majority of which are in the form of artefacts. This text and these artefacts – these 
“technologies of the intellect” (Goody, 1977) – produce effects on behaviours within a 
company and contribute to shape social roles. The three consequences of the written form that 
can be identified in Goody’s work (1977) turns out to be extremely relevant as far as 
investment procedures are concerned. First, texts authorize interpretation and manipulations 
but, at the same time, serve as references. This tension between plasticity and rigidity 
epitomises the investment procedure manual: as a written text, it embodies the “law” as it is 
currently applied; but, as with all texts, it includes grey zones in which the reader may exploit, 
consciously or not, margins unforeseen by the author. Second, written forms and their 
associate communication modes (e.g. lists) develop alternative technical as well as intellectual 
skills. Investment procedures contain lists that classify investments into type (strategic, 
maintenance, productivity, etc.), or that oppose operational and investment capital 
expenditure, or checklists (strategic alignment, functional alignment). In addition to lists and 
checklists, investment procedures also contain tables, diagrams, drop down lists, economic-
mathematical formulae (discounted cash flow, internal rate of return, pay back, discounting 
rate). It is these cognitive artefacts – amplifiers of aptitudes and competences for those who 
use them – that we will study in more depth. Third, beyond the individual skills they 
contribute to produce, written forms of communication shape power distribution. Investment 
procedures as tangible techniques are certainly auxiliaries to power; however, the written 
form confers on its users the faculty of interpreting the text. Here, we find the tension between 
the plasticity of a text and, conversely, its capacity to lay things out. The procedure and its 
artefacts are therefore  tools for exercising power, even if the latter may be subordinated to 
unexpected “deviant” behaviours. An empirical study into investment procedures conducted 
in France in 2004 will enable us to show how writing in conjunction with technologies of the 
intellect produces effects on the social organisation of investment decision-making and on the 
social roles of each actor, thus creating a singular world. 
 
3. Methodology of the Empirical Study  
This article is based on empirical research conducted in six multinational corporations of 
French or European origin in 2004. Our study refer to six cases, whose level of analysis is the 
company and whose unit of analysis is the investment procedure. As a qualitative piece of 
research, our empirical study aims at accounting for a subjective reality on the world of 
investment decision-making rather than revealing what could be called its objective reality. 
As claimed by Ahrens and Chapman, we believe that “through their specific ways of 
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suggestive of analytical categories, qualitative field studies can frequently question common 
sense notions of management accounting phenomena.” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, p.831) 
3.1. On the relevance of the cases constituting the qualitative empirical study 
We adopted a multi-sites empirical methodology based on six company cases that were 
selected on an empirical and theoretical ground and not at random (Eisenhardt, 1989). The six 
cases fit with the conceptual framework by offering active procedures that seem to be 
internalised by managers and fashion their roles. Even if we observe some similar 
phenomenon, we didn’t intend to reach literal replication (Yin, 2003) in the first place. We 
actually believe that convergences in observation are not an essential condition to lead to 
theoretical development. As pointed out by Ahrens and Chapman (2006), replication is 
inappropriate for qualitative research since, for the latest, social reality is emergent, 
subjectively created and objectified through interaction. Identical results cannot be expected 
from two different studies. At best, compatible results may be expected. Therefore, we didn’t 
look for objective validity nor reliability in our six qualitative case studies. In such type of 
research, validity and reliability are difficult to distinguish. What counts is the plausibility of 
the conclusions that can be strengthened by the prior knowledge of the scholar on her 
empirical field, the multiplicity of standpoints and the reflexive ability of the scholar to 
question her own results (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, p.833). 
Our empirical study is used as a tool for theory development on the subjectivation part of the 
institutionalisation process. As suggested above, our approach differs from a positivistic 
tradition because testing and verifying are not part of our procedure. On the opposite 
epistemological positioning, our work also differs from Glaser and Strauss’s position because 
we reject the assumption that a researcher begins with a clean slate. We argue that a 
researcher’s subjectivity is not a true problem, since “we are all producing orderliness in our 
writings, sequences of relationships […] putting pieces together, picking and choosing to pay 
attention and ignore” (Calás and Smircich, 1999, p.664). What is more problematic in 
research writing, according to these authors, is unrecognised partiality, which leads them to 
advocate “modest narratives” that make researchers’ partial choices clear. Let us clarify these 
partial choices.  
Each large in size, the six companies belong to different sectors of activity (see Table 1). 
They have been chosen among listed companies having stable investment. We selected 
companies for which investment constituted a regular annual flow because regularity in 
ordinary investment tends to establish investment procedure as a routine. The stability of 
annual investment (in its occurrence and its nature) was an important empirical selection 
criteria since we believe it is in such context that norms rise and may get internalised by 
organisational actors. As shown in Table 1, the six companies have investment spending 
comprised between 4 and 9% of their turnover. Moreover, these investments are strategic in 
order to maintain or expand their major activities. That’s why four of them carry out industrial 
investments for the most part and the two others expend mainly in marketing and R&D 
investment. We have assumed that the steadiness and core business orientation of investment 
in these six companies are related to the existence of an active investment procedure. 
Investment procedures are lively or active in the organisation when they are regularly 
updated. We assume that such updating leads to a change in social roles that corporate 
management wants to promote. In that respect, the liveliness of investment procedures is 
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another essential criteria to select the cases of our empirical study (see Table 1). 
 
Company  AERI PHAR ALU  AUTO  MAT  PARTS 
Sector Airline  Pharmaceuticals  Aluminium Automobile Materials Automobile 
Dominant Type 
of Investment  Marketing  R&D 
Marketing  Industrial Industrial Industrial  Industrial 
Turnover (2002, 




(2002, billion €) 
Non 
available  1,1 0,5  3,1  1,4  0,8 
Investments’ 
part in the 
turnover (2002, 
%) 
 6% 4%  9%  5%  8% 
 











































Table 1: The Companies Studied 
 
3.2. On the observed data and the methods chosen to analyse them 
“Data are not untainted slices of objective reality but aspects of recorded activity that a study 
finds significant for theoretical reasons” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, p.820). As developed 
in sections 2.3 and 2.4, our theoretical project in this paper is to account for the social 
dimension of accounting by studying the effects of accounting devices’ written properties. In 
that respect, investment procedures seem a highly relevant unit of analysis. As shown in the 
end of section 2.4, they are key devices in investment decision-making and, as such, 
contribute to the formalisation of the financial paradigm. Second, they are based on the 
recourse to the written word and on a series of intellectual technologies or cognitive artefacts 
(see end of section 2.4). Investment procedures prescribe the stages and tests trough which all 
investment projects must pass before being accepted or not. As suggested in Exhibit 1, they 
govern the conditions of acceptability and constitutes a powerful device of formalization. 
Procedures establish the definitions, categories and typologies entailed in investment. They 
describe the hierarchical or functional stages through which projects must imperatively go 
according to their features (e.g., corporate responsibility center management, financial 
management, human resource management, etc.). Furthermore, procedures lay out the 
compliance tests that projects must undergo: financial profitability, strategic or even social 
compliance. 
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Tabl e of contents 
1.   I ntroducti on ................................................................................................................. 3 
2.   A u th o rizatio n  P o lic y .................................................................................................... 4 
2.1  K ey principles ....................................................................................................... 4 
2.2  P roject authorization policy ................................................................................... 6 
2.2.1  N ew  P rojects .............................................................................................. 6 
2.2.2  P roject pre-planning ................................................................................... 7 
2.2.3  P roject overruns ......................................................................................... 7 
2.2.4  N on-consolidated projects .......................................................................... 7 
2.2.5  A uthorizations for acquisition and disposal of R eal P roperty ...................... 8 
2.2.6  A uthorization of IS  investm ents .................................................................. 8 
2.2.7  R evie w  and authorization procedure ........................................................ 10 
2.3  C apital A uthorization R equest (C .A .R )................................................................ 11 
2.3.1  F ront P age................................................................................................ 11 
2.3.2  R evie w  P age ............................................................................................ 13 
2.3.3  E xecutive S um m ary : D escription &  R ationale ......................................... 13 
2.3.4  E conom ics ................................................................................................ 14 
2.3.5  C apex funding for IS  projects ................................................................... 17 
2.3.6  IS  projects in P .B .C . ................................................................................. 17 
2.4  E conom ic E valuation .......................................................................................... 18 
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In each of the six companies selected for our study, the procedure common to the whole of the 
company was available for consultation as well as specific procedure manuals when this was 
deemed necessary. The six procedures that were studied vary in size, form and content as 
shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Characteristics of the six investment procedures  
  11A content analysis was completed for each procedure. After having conducted some readings 
of procedures, we constructed an initial coding framework composed of five main codes: the 
procedures’ form, definitions, involved actors, thresholds and methodologies for investment 
valuation. This initial coding framework drew from the academic literature on investment and 
our initial reading of some of the six investment procedures. It was broadly supplemented 
over the course of on-site observation of the procedures and evolved still further during their 
analysis. Rather than structuring the reading of the procedures around many predefined 
categories, our intention was to identify from the issues emerging during reading and 
triangulating interviews
4 what the categories for coding should be. As Anderson-Gough et al. 
(2005) state, this is one way of addressing the issue of ‘dynamism’ in the research process. A 
monograph was eventually drawn up for each company and subsequently validated during an 
interview or a written exchange with the company
5. In short, the research protocol was 





Exhibit 2: Overview of the research protocol 
Phase 1: browsing the texts (on-site – 5 cases; off-site – 1 case) 
Phase 2: interviewing holders of the procedure manuals 
Phase 3: coding according to characteristic items 
Phase 4: drawing up a monograph 
Phase 5: validating the monograph (interview or written exchange) 
As the initial coding framework
6 suggests, the theme of the institutionalisation process 
performed by investment procedures was not central to our research initially. It did, however, 
prove to be highly relevant over the course of our empirical study to understand the social 
dimensions of these procedures. It is for this reason that we have chosen it as the central axis 
of analysis. The gap between what our codes describe and the angle of attack finally chosen to 
analyse these codes may seem troubling. In fact, this echoes a frequent misconception 
regarding qualitative data analysis: the assumption that the coding somehow constitutes 
analysis (Anderson-Gough et al. 2005). In the following part dedicated to the results of the 
empirical study, we will see how the formal features of investment procedures participate into 
the three conditions of the production of social roles through institutionalisation, namely the 
objectivation, the stabilisation and the subjectivation. 
 
4. Social roles emerging from investment procedures 
From this empirical study, we intend to analyse the process of institutionalisation through 
investment procedures as much in their form as in their content. Investment procedures 
actually present two major features of form: use of the written word coupled with recourse to 
                                                      
4 To triangulate data collected in the investment procedures, interviews were conducted in the departments 
supervising procedure (management control, departments specifically managing investments or financial 
departments according to each case). 
5 The complete results from this study are available in the following report: Pezet A. (2004), “Les procédures 
d’investissement des entreprises. Une étude comparative », Cahier de recherche du Crefige, Université Paris 
Dauphine. This report includes the six monographs, summary tables and a comparative analysis of the 
investment procedures. 
6 As written previously, the initial coding framework is built on 5 codes: the procedures’ form, definitions, 
involved actors, thresholds and methodologies for investment valuation 
  12technologies of the intellect. These two features play a full role in the process of 
institutionalisation as defined by Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000) by delimiting the domain 
of action (objectivation), by defining the principles of performance and the rules of conduct 
(stabilisation), and by producing social roles (subjectivation).  
4.1. Objectivation: Defining a Delimited Domain of Action 
The procedure plays a role in defining a delimited domain of action by objectifying ideals and 
discourse through written formalisation. Ideals and discourses
7 are, here, of two orders: 
firstly, a national or international level – macroscopic; secondly, a corporate level – 
mesoscopic
8. The first level may be spotted in political and administrative discourses. A case 
in point, a report by the French Senate (Senate Report, 2002/2003) contains several 
indications of national ideals regarding investment: the link with growth, the growing 
intangibility of investment, the need to promote innovation, and the perception that France 
(and Europe) is lagging behind the United States. The mesoscopic level, i.e. the corporate 
level, may be seen in the strategies and policies developed by senior managements. A brief 
investigation of the six companies in the empirical study (annual reports and Internet sites) 
shows that the most frequently used categories in strategic discourses are: growth and 
internationalisation, value creation and profitability, competitiveness and leadership, 
innovation, and a client orientation. National ideals and corporate discourses therefore overlap 
to a large extent and constitute a framework for demarcating the procedure’s domain of 
action.  
In the procedures studied, the domain of action appears in two forms: defining the procedure’s 
goals and defining the investment. The procedure’s goals are of different natures: framing the 
investment process(es) within a company; defining a common vocabulary or ensuring the 
methods used are homogeneous; guiding operational managers in how to design investment 
projects; presenting commitments made by operational managers in the requests themselves; 
or implementing strategy, creating value or controlling profitability.  
Two large categories of goals emerge from this succinct inventory. Firstly, the procedural text 
underlines the scope of the device for operational managers (on one hand: framing – guiding – 
commitment; on the other: language – homogeneity). This is, therefore, a matter of creating 
conditions for the production of social roles by implicating and controlling operational 
managers and by establishing a common reference, in other words, by creating a world of 
investment decision-making with its own rules, codes and role-types. Secondly, the formally 
drawn-up goals written down in procedure manuals create conditions for investment decision-
making that are consistent with the ideals and discourses uttered by corporate management 
boards (growth and internationalisation, value and profitability, competitiveness and 
leadership, innovation, and a client orientation). We can therefore see that the defining of the 
domain of action that is delimited by the investment procedure hinges on the formulating of 
its goals. This formulation may take the form of a diagram like ALU’s “virtuous cycle of 
investment” as illustrated below.  
                                                      
7 This task of analysing ideals and discourses would demand a specific work of research. Here we will limit 
ourselves to giving several snapshots. 
8 We will hold the term microscopic in reserve for a future study into management devices.  
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Exhibit 3: ALU’s “Virtuous Cycle of Investment” 
 
In one glance, the actors visualise the major aims of investment according to ALU’s senior 
management. This formalisation facilitates the transcribing of these aims into the ways actors 
think in the form of a cycle that regenerates in a virtuous manner. Positioned as the header to 
the procedural document, this diagram configures the reader’s way of thinking (the person 
who will request an investment project, the person who will control it, or the person who will 
approve it) by placing him or her at the heart of the main aims set out, in particular, the 
creation of value. This first configuration of the actors’ roles can be found in another form in 
the definition of the investment itself.  
The definition of the investment, as presented in the procedures we have studied, appears 
polymorphous: using accounting terms (fixed assets, current assets, asset base), economic 
terms (a set of expenditures, capitalised or not, a project with its own economic justification), 
and through opposition (capital expenditure costs as opposed to running or maintenance 
costs). However, the most salient feature is the scope of the boundary set in all of the 
companies and, in particular, with regard to intangible costs and IT systems.  
  The boundary of PARTS’ investment procedure covers capitalised expenditure 
whose fixed assets are produced internally, leasing contracts and long-term 
leases but also non-capitalised expenditure: investments partially taken on by 
the client (equipment), the cost of studies linked to the project, social and 
restructuring costs, and the costs of leasing real estate, strategy and 
communication consulting, purchasing, leasing or the internal and external 
development of IT programmes.  
(PARTS Monograph) 
 
Defining the investment no longer just covers physical capitalised expenditure, but also 
encompasses all tangible resources or resources that will yield neither tangible nor intangible 
future gain. The domain of action is considerably enlarged, submitting numerous expenses to 
the procedure, to its rules, codes and measurements. This extension of the domain of action is 
in line with new investment ideals – see above – and, in particular, the growing intangibility 
of investments (Senate Report, 2002/2003). 
  14The main forms of concretization at this stage are the text and the typology. The text enables 
boundaries of what an investment is to be set in principle, and consequently the boundaries of 
action of those who use it as shown the following definitions extracted from two procedures: 
  “We call an [investment] project a set of capital 
expenditures and/or charges that are involved in achieving a 
determined goal, possessing a justification and/or its own 
profitability.” (AERI Monograph) 
“Capital expenditure traded for creating or acquiring assets designed to serve 
the company’s activity in a sustainable way.” (ALU Monograph) 
 
 
However, the definitions are sufficiently loose to leave actors margin for maneuver: capital 
expenditure and/or charges, justification and/or profitability, the use of “and/or” leaves actors 
with considerable freedom; “to serve the company’s activity in a sustainable way” is 
sufficiently imprecise to cover a variety of projects
9. 
In addition to the written form, defining the investment also relies on cognitive artefacts. The 
investment may be classified according to diverse typologies: previous / current; strategic / 
non-strategic  (depending on a monetary sum or a group decision); by targeted function 
(growth, renewal or maintenance, compliance, productivity, energy savings, R&D, quality, 
anti-pollution, health and safety, social, administrative or commercial investments); or by 
categories internal to the company in question (inside or outside a product range in the 
automobile sector, a client project or not in the automobile equipment sector, or a technical 
category in the Airline industry).  PHAR thus has three large “project categories” from 
amongst which the project supervisor must choose:  
Project Category  Description 
COMP 
Compliance  
•  Investments made to address regulatory matters, to prevent or 
reduce damage to the environment, to improve safety and 
working conditions, to promote good manufacturing practices 
•  The economic benefits of those investments are mostly 





•  Replacement of an existing asset that has exhausted its useful 
life 
•  Investments with qualitative benefits such as software update 
•  Site infrastructure improvement 
•  The economic benefits of those investments are mostly 
measured by the risk taken if they were not implemented. 
                                                      
9 In this respect, definitions of procedures broadly correlate to IFRS norms. IFRS 16 deals with “Property, Plant, 
and Equipment”, meaning the “tangible assets held by an enterprise for use in the production, supply of goods or 
services, rental, or administration purposes, and are expected to be used during more than one period”. IFRS 38 
deals with intangible assets, meaning “identifiable, non monetary assets without physical substance, held for use 
in the production, supply of goods or services, rental to others, or administration purposes.” (Van Greuning & 
Koen, 2000). 
  15RPG 
Revenue and 
Profitability Growth 
•  New capacity or increase of an existing one  
•  Investments with quantitative benefits such as 
product/process feature improvements driving immediate 
cost savings. 
•  The economic benefits of those investments can directly be 
identified and measured 
Table 3: An Example of an Investment Typology (PHAR) 
Depending on the category to which it belongs, the project may be subject to a different 
treatment (a multi-criteria analysis, for instance, for projects whose financial profitability is 
impossible to calculate). These lists (that can be mechanised and transformed into drop down 
lists) guide operational managers and limit their range of choice. The development of a 
project begins with a closed choice from the categories proposed; this choice may then 
determine the direction the project takes. We can thus see, behind the desire to control 
projects from the moment they are defined, that an opportunity has been left open for 
operational managers to qualify their project and so to “play” with the delimited domain of 
action. This is all the more so since defining this domain entails specific correlating 
performance principles and rules of conduct.  
4.2. Stabilisation: Defining Performance Principles  
Procedures play a part in defining performance principles and rules of conduct in several 
ways, and particularly through the compiling of a request for each project, the use of valuation 
techniques, and the implementing of a process of post-valuation. Procedures contribute to 
define two levels of performance: the performance of the investment decision-making process 
and the performance of the investment itself.  
The first level of performance is shaped by the degree of automation characterizing the 
procedure. All of the six studied procedure are available via an Intranet. Throughout the 
procedures, numerous artefacts rely on automation (PHAR, AUTO, PARTS), where a series 
of IT tools supplement the procedure (online investment requests, support in calculating, 
strategic and functional interfacing, etc.). What varies here is how the IT tools are used: from 
simply making the procedure accessible via a network to designing tools for calculating, 
supporting decision-making and controlling.   
  PHAR has set up control and interfacing tools which constitute real instruments 
to support decision-making. The Capital Authorization Request, a benchmark 
request for investment projects, and the Interface check list, an exercise in 
strategic prioritisation, are available in the form of Word or Excel sheets. The 
different actors fill out the relevant data fields and/or sign the document 
electronically for approval. The documents are designed both to gather open 
opinions (comments, justifications, explications) and to validate closed choices 
(using numerous drop down lists). The coherence of the choices is equally 
ensured using automatic links between data fields, enabling an opportunity for 




The second level of performance, namely the performance of the investment itself, is defined 
with the support of valuation techniques. In all the procedures studied, the prescription of one 
  16particular technology of the intellect dominates: the economic-mathematical formula. 
Classical profitability criteria are used in all the companies studied. Discounted Cash Flow 
(DCF), Internal Rate of Return (IRR), and pay back, make up the benchmark toolbox, with 
various particularities depending on the company: the use of the profit index - DCF/I – either 
as a complement to, or in place of DCF, or even as a norm for approving or rejecting projects; 
the calculation of discounted pay back; the non-use of DCF and the priority accorded to pay 
back using a norm determined by senior management; the priority accorded to DCF for 
strategic projects and to pay back for minor projects. Overall, the DCF formula dominates to a 
large extent. 
Goody (1977) qualifies the formulae as “fixed statements of relationships in abstract form; 
indeed, they […] bear a minimal resemblance to the speech of ordinary […]” (p.198). 
Expressing DCF derives from the mathematical formalisation: 
DCF = Σ [CF / (1+i)
n] - I 
Yet its content is essentially economic: the project’s forecast cash flows (CF), over the 
duration of the investment (n), discounted at the discount rate i, minus the amount initially 
expended (I). DCF is therefore based on forecasts of demand, production, price, costs, etc.; on 
the average weighted cost of capital; on a provisional estimate; that is to say, on economic 
data. The mathematical formulation is only auxiliary, translating an economic reflection to 
produce an “abridged version” that is readable, adaptable and comparable
10. Deploying it 
produces several consequences. 
The first consequence concerns the very composition of artefacts such as DCF or IRR: only 
quantifiable data have their place here. This primacy granted to figures over qualitative data 
(strategic, social or environmental) significantly limits the actors’ analytical capability. It 
fosters an all-too-narrow vision of how a company really runs (Adler, 2000). Calculating DCF 
and IRR generally does not take into account the transverse consequences of the investment 
on the whole of a company’s processes (the productivity of operations outside the process 
targeted by the investment, for example). This is the reason why companies develop in 
parallel complementary methods. Beyond these essentially financial metrics, all the 
procedures analysed in the study recommend the use of non-financial, even non-quantitative 
data – soft data. A series of data on markets, competition, technology, scheduling, social and 
environmental impact, etc., is called upon in decision-making on a par with financial values. 
Their significance is generally reiterated as well as their complementarity, even superiority, to 
financial criteria.  
  Even though profitability analysis criteria aim to “give in easily understood 
terms an idea of the profitability of the investment considered”, MAT’s 
procedure states that, “in practice, contrary to the situation-type often chosen for 
academic presentations, we can see that the role of profitability criteria is rarely 
to classify the set of investment projects open to a company by order of 
decreasing profitability and thus to optimise the use of available funds. In fact, 
more often, investment decisions made by a company present themselves 
sequentially over time”. As a general rule, financial criteria are considered non-
preponderant: “We should keep in mind that the profitability criterion is a 
 
                                                      
10 We will not enter here into the technical debate over the comparability of DCF or IRR measurements.  
  17generally necessary but insufficient criterion in itself and that it may sometimes 
be dominated by the strategic criterion”.   
(MAT Monograph) 
An awareness of the limiting of actors’ analytical capabilities to numerical data alone is 
therefore strong in the companies studied. The adoption of soft data as a complement to 
financial devices improves the actors’ analytical capabilities, but also makes more complex 
operations of data manipulation that are the foundation for dialogue between actors and for 
comparing projects. 
The second consequence can be found in the actors’ capacity to perceive time. Investment 
projects are conjugated in the future tense. Data are provisional and the horizon may be more 
or less distant, even unpredictable (calculations of profitability are generally done using 
conventional durations whereas certain investments – a production site, for example – will 
have very long life spans). Artefacts such as DCF or IRR, and especially pay back, brutally 
shut down the temporal horizon: DCF, and so the IRR, through the choice ex ante of an often 
reduced lifespan for the investment; pay back by its very outcome since any period following 
the moment of pay back is not considered. The visionary capacity of the actors is therefore 
limited by these intellectual technologies. This effect is strengthened by the use of a discount 
rate that mechanically reduces the value of the investment’s gains from year to year. Finally, 
the traditional toolbox may induce behavioural bias: managers will tend to favour short-term 
profits and thus the most profitable projects within this timeframe for which managers will be 
judged.  
The third consequence springs from the conversion, using a mathematical formula, of 
economic data that is “living” because it is provisional, into an object that has certainly 
become more malleable but also far less comprehensible in its entirety. We thus trade off 
complexity for apparent simplicity or, to use Latour’s (2004) imaginative terminology, 
“hairy” objects with plenty of potential snags for “bald” unassailable objects. Actors thus 
lose out in analytical capability what they gain in apparent ease of reading, comparability and 
opportunity for dialogue. Project valuation therefore errs between economic-mathematical 
artefacts (smooth, but fostering operations of manipulation like comparison) and more 
complex data (rough, but preserving the intrinsic qualities of a project). However, the search 
for a balance between financial criteria and soft data remains affected by a context that leans 
heavily towards the modern paradigm of investment choice.  
The methods used in companies are in fact strongly linked to the system of decision-making 
rules: according to Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994), these rules are based on heuristics that 
reflect the “conventional wisdom” that lead us to expect the best performances. A heuristic is 
a trade-off between ease-of-use and relevance. Thus, stating that projects with a strong DCF 
will be carried out is a heuristic. The heuristic described by Kogut and Kulatilaka resembles a 
genuine programming of decision-making (and of minds?). The strength of the paradigm 
derives from the community of thought that is reinforced, again according to the authors, by 
other factors from inside and outside the company. The integration amongst investment 
choices, budgetary systems and strategic planning is strong (this point appears in the research 
as being particularly verified). So, budgetary rules, enforced in the majority of companies, are 
based on the toolbox (DCF, IRR and pay back) when it comes to programming investments. 
These methods attain a high rate of reoccurrence in the budgets calendar (generally annual) 
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structural analysis) based on decreasingly relevant patterns (economies of scale, market share, 
etc.) reinforce the effects of traditional devices for investment choice.  
A common logic stands out from these related devices, which favours existing activities to the 
detriment of new products or processes. In parallel, the division of companies into Strategic 
Business Units, which partition companies according to the dichotomy products / markets, is a 
brake on the development of transversal capabilities and points managers towards short-term 
profitability, thus accentuating one of the effects of artefacts such as DCF. Finally, the 
financial markets demand that companies produce short-term rather than long-term profits.  
These different heuristics are mutually strengthening to favour the short-term over the long-
term, what already exists over innovation, and routine over change. As a general rule, it is 
uncertainty and a long-term vision that are sacrificed and, as a result, the most innovative 
investments that are also often the most profitable:  
“In growing but uncertain markets, a heuristic that says accept projects that promise 
to pay 20% on invested assets (or on operating income) conveys the message, ‘Exit 
the market when uncertain” (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994, p. 56). 
Technologies of the intellect that are the foundations of investment project valuation therefore 
impose structure on actors’ social roles, whether expected or not, and all the more so since 
these technologies are supported by a context that, itself, imposes strong structure.  
4.3. Subjectivation: Producing Social Roles 
By delimiting a domain of action and defining performance principles, and through the 
intermediary of written texts and other techniques of the intellect, investment procedures 
produce considerable effects on decision-making (a strong or limited analytical capability, a 
facilitated, or not, comparative activity, etc.). Furthermore, social roles are forged in the 
procedures in three ways: first, by setting the context in which roles will be delineated, 
through a choice between bureaucratic formalization and pedagogical purpose; second, by 
establishing decision-making thresholds and, third, by defining formally the tasks and 
responsibilities of each person. These features are found in all the procedures studied.  
Firstly, companies set the context in which everybody will act as a participant to the 
investment decision-making process. Two ways of doing were found in our sample: three of 
the companies establish such a context by a bureaucratic process, two others by pedagogical 
means. When the bureaucratic way is chosen (AERI, ALU, PARTS), the procedure is signed 
by its authors, approved by the hierarchy, and provided with a closed list of recipients, etc 
(see Exhibit 4). The bureaucratic presentation aims to attribute the responsibilities, the 
powers, and the scope of the procedure’s recipients, and to do this on an individual and 
nominal basis. 
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INVESTMENT PROCEDURE  
 Name  Title  Date  Visa 
Author Mr  X MC  12/01  J 
Validation Mrs  Y  FD  12/01  Q 
Approval Mr  Z  MD  11/01  R 
DOCUMENT HISTORY 
Date   Modification 
02/02  Version 1 – Revision 0 
LISTS OF UPDATED PAGES 
Page Version  Revision  Date 
1 to 50  1  0  12/01 
      
      
      
LIST OF RECIPIENTS 
Recipient Number  of 
Copies 
Recipient Number  of 
Copies 
Service A  1  Service B  1 
Management C  2  Service C  1 
ETC.      
Exhibit 4: The bureaucratic style of Procedures, Cover Pages from AERI and ALU 
Another way of setting the general context of social roles goes through the adoption of a 
pedagogical approach. In two companies (PHAR, AUTO), procedures possess a pedagogical 
character: specific materials supplement the procedure (slide presentations, “leaflets”, etc.). 
The procedure may also include pedagogical or didactic material to communicate with and to 
train users. 
  Pedagogy is an integral part of managing investment at AUTO: pedagogical 
sheets in the form of small leaflets with humorous illustrations and materials 
aimed at training demonstrate this point. AUTO also provides, in addition to its 
formal procedure, a set of documents designed for communication and training. 
(AUTO Monograph)  
 
 
Secondly, the progress of investment projects amongst the different decision-making actors is 
always a function of monetary thresholds. The delegation of powers is the rule for investment 
up to an amount defined by senior management. These thresholds are variable from one 
company to another, and from one type of investment to another. The project may be 
approved at the business unit level, the branch or division level, or else at the senior 
management level. Certain companies distinguish approval or granting consent from 
sponsorship, endorsement or project review. The table below illustrates this delegation of 
power through thresholds’ setting at PARTS. 
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On condition of pay back in < 3 
years 
Budgeted Non-budgeted 
Branch  < = 3 million euros  < = 1 million euros 
Branch + Group  > 3 million euros  > 1 million euros 
The thresholds are firstly monetary but can also depend on other criteria: here, 
on pay back and the budgeting of the investment. 
Table 4: Delegation Thresholds at PARTS 
Thresholds are generally defined on a monetary basis. However, other criteria, and in 
particular the nature of the investment, may also be taken into account. Thus, subject to lower 
thresholds are IT projects in several cases, but also real-estate investments, patent-purchasing 
or expenditure of a social or environmental nature. These are costs that are generally more 
difficult to control and whose profitability is not easy to qualify, hence the need to monitor 
them closely. Setting specific thresholds is a means of strengthening control over these 
investments. 
  In one of ALU’s divisions, lower thresholds are defined for purchasing patents 
and licences, land and real-estate, and risky projects such as health, safety or the 
environment, software, IT hardware for management and communication. 
(ALU Monograph) 
 
Furthermore, thresholds that are not strictly monetary are used either to determine the 
strategic character of certain investments or for specific or low-yield projects.  
  During the development meetings of the five-year plan at MAT, a list of the 
main investments the group wishes to validate is drawn up. This enables 
managers to take into account, over and above the expenditure amounts alone, 
inexpensive but strategic investments; in particular in the small companies 
within the group. Indeed, the diversity of business units that make up the group 
would not allow us to spot investments that are important or not, by imposing 
rigid delegation thresholds. A role is therefore granted to judging on a case-by-
case basis, as well as a role played by the wider context of managing a diverse 
group.  
(MAT Monograph) 
At PARTS, the threshold is higher (and so delegation is more widespread) for 
projects linked to the client’s needs. On the other hand, all projects with 
payback of 3 or more years are supervised by senior management. Furthermore, 
decision-making on redundancy plans, which are subject to investment 
procedures, is delegated according to thresholds defined by staff.  
(PARTS Monograph) 
 
By setting decision-making thresholds, we create roles and at the same time clearer 
boundaries delimiting the domain of action. Roles and domains of action are mutually 
enmeshed resulting in each actor having a precise corresponding function, with a precise level 
of involvement, monetary or not. Setting thresholds is a matter of remote action. Recourse to 
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this remote action, very accurately delimiting the actors’ areas of implication, with the head of 
the hierarchy defining the roles remotely.  
In addition to thresholds defining the areas and levels of actors’ implication, investment 
procedures include important developments focusing on actors’ different functions, missions 
and responsibilities. Several major features emerge from the study. The first is the existence 
of departments managing investment. Indeed, although management control remains a major 
actor in the process, departments managing investment appear in two companies. In both 
cases, they are nonetheless supervised by central management control.  
  PHAR has thus set up functions and structures aimed at investment: Capital 
investment manager, under the authority of the Corporate controller, Capital 
management committee,  Capex coordinator or Corporate Capex team, for 
example. 
(PHAR Monograph) 
AUTO has set up a management team dedicated to managing investment, the 
Board of investment control that counts around thirty people. Supervised by the 
management control board, it plays a role in the whole process from preparing 
the outline of investment policy to managing the accounting of assets. Its role is 
important when drawing up and appraising investment requests. Its action is 
relayed by correspondents throughout the different management teams and 
professions. It is also charged with managing procedures and training with 
respect to investment. 
(AUTO Monograph) 
 
Committees to manage investment are sometimes set up. They differ from ad hoc committees 
or planning and budgetary meetings that occur in other companies because of the permanent 
nature of their composition. This first feature translates the need to coordinate and control 
investment projects highly.  
Thirdly, an important characteristic concerns commitments made by operational managers. If 
validated at a competent level of the hierarchy, the investment project also particularly 
implicates the responsibility of the project manager or the principal investment supervisor. 
This person is committed to providing quality data for decision-making, to ensuring the best 
implementation of the investment and then overseeing the effective achievement of the 
programmed outcomes. This role is therefore central to all procedures. However, it may be 
more or less formalised.  
  The decision-making process at AUTO is based on an investment project 
contract, a document of approximately thirty pages that implicates operational 
managers. This document was first released in 1999, replacing the investment 
project request: the change in terminology clearly marks a desire to 
contractualise the process.   
(AUTO Monograph) 
 
In a way that is consistent with the idea of contractualisation, the definition of the investment 
is also complemented with the definition of the project as a coherent set of capital 
  22expenditures with specific goals or a strategic investment that, due to its size, nature or impact 
on the company’s activity, may be treated in a specific manner. This second feature translates 
the need for a priori commitments made by operational managers to their hierarchy.  
Finally, the last feature is present in all the procedures analysed. Consultation with functional 
departments is always required. Project managers are called to consult with experts from the 
marketing, sales, technical, information-technology, staff management and financial fields. 
Once again, this is done in a more or less formalised manner. Certain procedures include this 
consultation in the request itself; others mention it as a mandatory step but without 
formalising it explicitly. PHAR has formalised the interfacing process through a specific 
document that includes mandatory and optional interfaces:  
 
MANDATORY INTERFACES 
These interfaces confirm the need for implementing this project; they are mandatory and must 
be completed when applicable before submission of your project. 
 
 
• Engineering (if applicable) 
Objectives: Justify the needs for the project 




Yes  No 
   
Actions taken 
 
e.g. Statement from Engineering 
•       
 
 
Exhibit 5: Mandatory Interfaces in the Investment Procedure at PHAR 
This third feature translates the need for consultation with a wide range of experts when faced 
with the complexity of decision-making.  
The involvement of individual or collective actors is therefore well framed in all the 
procedures. The roles and responsibility of each one are well defined. Three types of 
relationship are thus envisaged: a coordination and control relationship which governs the 
progress of projects amongst those implicated; a hierarchical relationship that submits projects 
and commitments made by managers to the agreement of intermediary or superior levels of 
the company (generally according to the amounts – see above - with the support of a sponsor 
in certain cases); and a functional relationship which submits the project to the expertise of 
support functions (marketing, purchasing, technical, finance, etc.). The social roles forged by 
the procedure therefore stem from a three-fold necessity: coordination and control, 
implication and hierarchy, and expertise.  
We can therefore spotlight the major figures (associated with one predominant function) who 
populate the idealised world of investment decision-making:   
o  The figure of project manager through his commitments;  
o  The figure of decision-maker through his/her power (generally hierarchical) to 
approve, or not, the project’s go-ahead;  
o  The figure of sponsor characterised by the political support that s/he brings to the 
project manager thanks to his/her intermediary position in the hierarchy;  
  23o  The figure of expert characterised by his/her technical competence, whether that be in 
the financial, legal, marketing, social or production-process fields;  
o  The figure of coordinator characterised by his/her involvement in ensuring the 
appropriate use of the procedure and by his/her power to control its form if not also its 
content.  
These major figures define as many ideal roles in the mind of the observer as the corporate 
world and its managers may care to create around investment. Personification through social 
roles of the ideals tied to investment is the completion of the process of institutionalisation. It 
is because these roles internalise in fine the ideals and discourses through the mediation of 
management devices that these very ideals and discourses may be put into practice. This 
process of institutionalisation maps a pathway between levels of analysis that are commonly 
kept apart: the discourse, the social and the technical. Investment procedures thus appear as 
quasi-objects (Latour, 1987) ensuring mediation between the local (the company, even the 
investment project) and the global (the national or world economy) and between what 
economic theories would like to explain as a “natural” phenomenon
11 (the investment as a 
response to determinant factors such as forecast demand, the costs of production factors, etc.) 
and society (how the investment becomes a social phenomenon through its effects on the 
economy, on employment, etc.). 
 
5. Conclusion 
This research has been driven by a strong assumption: considering that the form of accounting 
devices in itself has a great influence on individual’s roles in organizations. Indeed, studying 
an accounting device such as investment procedures according to its written properties 
(textuality and cognitive artefacts) has enabled us to increase the understanding of social 
dimensions of the institutionalisation process and to better capture how techniques shape 
society. Thanks to an empirical study conducted in 2004, investment procedures in six large 
companies in a French context have been analysed. In particular, we have shown how their 
specific written form takes effect during the process of institutionalisation, through which 
grand investment ideals (e.g. competitiveness, value creation) are transformed into concrete 
devices and into roles (Miller, 1991). To highlight accounting devices’ role in the 
institutionalisation process, we have drawn from sociological concepts stemming from 
cognitive science (Norman, 1991; 1993) and from social ethnography (Goody, 1977; 1986; 
2000) dealing with the characteristics of written texts. In particular, this paper shows that the 
procedural device closely associates written texts and the use of technologies of the intellect 
of different kinds. The text of investment procedures is in fact “studded” with cognitive 
artefacts that go from the simple list to elaborate codifications (financial profitability criteria, 
for example). Moreover, this text can be automated by using IT tools and the Internet. This 
meshing of written texts, more or less codified technologies of the intellect, and IT tools 
produces a complex device whose effects on the institutionalisation process are powerful. In 
brief, it is argued that (1) the definitions of investment through typologies shape the actors’ 
boundaries of action; (2) valuation methods based on the domination of economic-
                                                      
11 Along the lines of the natural or the so-called hard sciences. 
  24mathematical formula favour short-term over long-term reflection; (3) the setting of decision-
making thresholds formalise individuals’ tasks and responsibilities. Two features of the 
procedure itself (degree of formalisation of its objectives, degree of automation) sets the 
context in which social roles will be delineated, through a choice between bureaucratic 
formalization and pedagogical purpose. Therefore, the very form of procedures shape each 
phase of the institutionalisation process <objectivation – stabilisation – subjectivation> as 
defined by Hasselbladh and Kallinikos (2000) and contribute to creates a singular world – that 
of investment decisions. 
 
The two main limitations of this paper are (1) not to explain how society has come to this 
shaping of the world of investment decision by the financial paradigm and (2) to focus solely 
on a norm. About the first limitation, the omnipotence of the financial paradigm for 
investment decision-making is actually taken for granted in this paper. The story of the 
process leading to this omnipotence is in fact the subject of another paper in progress dealing 
with the historical evolution of grand investment ideals. As far as the second limitation is 
concerned, the investment procedure is definitely a normative device. It doesn’t mention 
anything about what practices are really like. However, the goal of this work is precisely to 
focus on the norm, on its structuring impact, and on what leaders want in terms of investment, 
rather than on what they actually get. Furthermore, the analysis of real capital authorization 
requests (three companies on the six that participated into this research gave us access to 
them) leads us to the conclusion that practices are ahead of the norm. Organizational actors 
give much more information than required in investment procedures when they initiate an 
investment decision-making process confirming the importance of the procedural device in 
the shaping of investment decision-making. Indeed, the few requests that we were able to 
consult include developments that go beyond the requirements of the procedure: for instance, 
calculations of EVA or comments provided on social or environmental impact do appear in 
the requests. However, a more in-depth analysis of their content would require another article. 
Eventually, this article explores one of the boundaries of neo-institutional studies. Overly 
macroscopic (or mesoscopic), most neo-institutional studies do not study microscopic devices 
through which grand ideals and discourses are institutionalised (Hasselbladh, Kallinikos, 
2000). How can we shift from an ideal of growth and competitiveness and a discourse of 
value creation or innovation, to its concrete practice with respect to investment? It is to this 
question that we have attempted to sketch some elements of an answer. Studying ordinary 
procedures – such as an investment procedure or a DCF as above – has enabled us to 
understand how the actors’ roles are forged. Studying the particular forms of this procedure – 
the recourse to the written word and to cognitive artefacts or technologies of the intellect – 
has enabled us to understand how individuals’ capabilities are stretched between analysis and 
synthesis, between long- and short-term vision, between autonomy and control, etc. This 
complex and largely hybrid blend of individuals, roles, capacities, artefacts of all kinds, 
discourses and ideals, shapes the world of investment decision-making. This world has 
consequences on the outcomes of decision-making (Porter, 1992; Hayes et al., 1988) in terms 
of national competitiveness, the allocation of resources between the short-term and the long-
term, between the tangible and the intangible, between the old and the new, etc. This is why it 
is necessary to fully understand its causes.  
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